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Abstract-A crucial issue in the empirical measurement of membership functions is whether the degree 
of fuzziness is invariant under different scaling procedures. In this paper a direct and an indirect procedure. 
magnitude estimation and graded pair-comparison, are compared in the context ofestablishing membership 
functions for probability phrases such as probable, rather likely, very unlikely, and so forth. Analyses at 
the level of individual respondents indicate that: (a)membership functions are stable over time; (b)functions 
for each phrase differ substantially over people; (c)the two procedures yield similarly shaped functions for 
a given person-phrase combination; (d) the functions from the two procedures differ systematically, m 
that those obtained directly dominate, or indicate greater fuzziness than do those obtamed indirectly; and 
(c)where the two differ the indirectly obtained function may be the more accurate one. A secondary 
purpose of the paper is to evaluate the effects of the modifiers very and rather. Very has a general 
intensifying effect that is described by Zadeh’s concentration model for 7 subjects and by a shift model 
for no one. The effects of rather are unsystematic and not described by any available model. 
INTRODUCTION 
The most fundamental concept in the theory of fuzzy sets is that of a fuzzy subset A of a universe 
of discourse U, with A characterized by a membership function p”(x) that associates with each 
point XE U its “grade of membership” in A. Usually, but not necessarily, pA(x) is assumed to range 
in the interval [0, 11. The numbers 0 and 1 correspond then, as assumed in this paper, to non- 
membership and full membership, respectively. 
The primary goal of the present paper is to compare membership functions constructed by two 
alternative scaling procedures, and the secondary goal is to evaluate the effects of certain modifiers 
on the membership functions. However, it is necessary first to address four issues and their 
experimental implications-the effects of context, the subjective nature of membership functions, 
variability in membership judgments and the problem of scale type. We discuss the first two issues 
only briefly but the latter two in more detail. 
It is generally recognized that membership functions depend, at least to some degree, on the 
context in which they are measured. For example, the grade of membership of a 60-year-old woman 
in the class of old women may vary from country to country depending on life expectancy. And the 
grade of membership of an event whose probability of occurrence is 0.2 in the class of unlikely 
events probably depends on whether the event gives rise to favorable or unfavorable outcomes. 
Without an exact specification of the context and an experimental investigation of the effects of 
context on vagueness and fuzziness, comparisons of membership functions constructed under dif- 
ferent experimental setups may be grossly misleading. Context is held fixed throughout the present 
study. 
The second issue stems from the fact that grades of membership are generally subjective. An 
important experimental implication of this subjectivity, which has not always been followed, is 
that within- rather than between-person designs should be implemented because averaging over 
membership functions from different individuals, even when the context is fixed, is meaningless. 
But even if these two relatively simple issues are properly addressed, a question arises as to 
whether the value of p”(x) can be determined accurately. The obvious paradoxical conclusion 
that the nature of fuzziness does not permit precise measurement of grades of membership led to 
the solution of creating a “type- 2” fuzzy set by laying a second level of membership over the 
original “type-l” membership function, then creating a “type-3” fuzzy set by laying a third level 
t The views, opinions and findings contained in this paper are those of the authors and should not be construed as 
official Department of the Army position, policy or decision. 
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of membership over the “type-2” membership, and so on. As noted by Norwich and Turksen, 
“The resulting infinite regress led to discouragement about whether a membership 
function could ever be meaningfully constructed” [ 1, p. 683. 
The resolution of this paradox proposed by Norwich and Turksen is similar in spirit to the 
philosophy underlying the experimental testing of algebraic models in decision making and other 
areas of cognitive psychology. It is based on the recognition that the infinite regress model outlined 
above treats the grade of membership on every level as deterministic, whereas in any actual scaling 
of subjective characteristics, determinism is impossible. As argued by Norwich and Turksen [2] 
and demonstrated experimentally by them [3] and Wallsten et al. [4], the repeated elicitation of 
grades of membership for a given subject in a well-defined context by some psychophysical scal- 
ing procedure (e.g. magnitude estimation, paired-comparison) yields variability in measurement. 
Norwich and Turksen claim that this variability “embodies all the uncertainty or imprecision in 
this value (and, equivalently, all the information about this value) which exists in the subject’s 
mind” [l, p. 691. One may, therefore, use the mean of a set of non-deterministic numerical responses 
as the grade of membership of a type-l fuzzy set with no need to amass higher levels of deterministic 
membership to model the subject’s fuzziness. 
The logic used by Norwich and Turksen to resolve the infinite regress paradox may be used 
against the form of their argument leading to their claim that the membership function is measurable 
at most on an interval scale. Norwich and Turksen have correctly contended that since a subject 
is not precisely sure of the meaning of a subjective concept, it is contradictory to the notion of 
fuzziness to assert that this concept partitions the universe of discourse precisely into three regions 
where p”(x) = 0, pA(x) = 1 and 0 < pA(x) < 1, respectively, the boundaries of which can be precisely 
determined (to within the limits of physical discriminability) [2,5]. Norwich and Turksen base this 
claim on the observation that the condition for a natural zero for a membership structure will be 
most likely not be met by a subject. Their claim, however, presupposes deterministic responses, 
whereas in practice the boundaries of the three regions determined by the membership function are 
determined statistically, just as are absolute thresholds and difference thresholds in psychophysical 
scaling. Precisely as one may employ the mean of a set of non-deterministic responses as the grade 
of membership of a particular element, one may use the mean of non-deterministic responses to 
determine the region’s boundaries. 
Our argument above illustrates the point that questions regarding response variability are 
logically distinct from those regarding scale type. With respect to this final issue, Gougen [6] has 
stated that the membership function can be no stronger than an ordinal scale, Norwich and Turksen 
[2,5] have claimed interval scale strength for the membership function, Saaty [7] has espoused 
the ratio scale, whereas Thole et al. [S] have asserted that grades of membership are measurable 
on an absolute scale. To resolve this controversy, it must be recognized that scale type is not 
arbitrary, but rather it minimally depends on properties of the particular measurement procedure 
utilized. Additional assumptions, ideally ones that are testable, then may be evoked on theoretical 
or pragmatic grounds to yield stronger scales. 
Experimental measurement of memhtvhip .functions 
Although much has been written about the measurement of fuzziness and vagueness, empirical 
work has been relatively sparse [e.g. 335,8- 151. Moreover, with the exception of an experiment by 
Norwich and Turksen [3,5], the empirical studies have each employed only a single scaling 
procedure to construct membership functions. They have not determined whether the resulting 
membership functions are invariant under various scaling procedures and if not, what are the 
relationships between membership functions obtained from the same subject by different procedures. 
The investigation of the invariance of fuzziness under different scaling procedures is as important 
to fuzzy set theory as is the study of invariance of other subjective perceptions to psychophysical 
theories. For example, discussing the theory of signal detection and commenting on three different 
procedures, the yes-no, rating and forced-choice tasks, for measuring the detection of weak signals 
in noise, Green and Swets wrote: 
“Comparing the results obtained from these different procedures is extremely im- 
portant because such comparisons provide the major test of the validity of the 
decision-theory analysis. If the analysis is verified, it yields measures of the detectability 
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of the signal that are independent of the procedure used to estimate these measures. 
Therefore, this analysis holds forth the possibility of psychophysical relations which 
are independent of procedure, a goal more often hoped for than achieved.” [16, p. 3 I] 
Once “fuzzy set theory” is substituted for the “decision-theory analysis” and “fuzziness of the 
concept” for “detectability of the signal”, this statement holds true also for the measurement of 
imprecise concepts by fuzzy set theory. 
The exception mentioned above is a study by Norwich and Turksen [3], who employed two 
scaling procedures, direct rating (also known as magnitude estimation) and reverse rating. For the 
direct rating procedure, the subject was presented one at a time with a life-sized wooden male 
figure of adjustable height or a cardhouse with adjustable dimensions. The subject was then asked 
to rate the tallness of the man or the aesthetic pleasantness of the house by adjusting the position 
of a pointer on a horizontal line segment. The left end-point of the segment corresponded to all 
men/houses which he or she felt were definitely not tall/pleasing, the right end-point to all those 
that were definitely tall/pleasing and the line segment between these two end-points was interpreted 
as representing how strongly the subject agreed that the man/house was tall/pleasing. For the 
reverse rating procedure, the pointer was randomly set to some position in the segment and the 
subject adjusted the height/dimensions of the man/house to correspond to the degree of membership 
indicated by the position of the pointer. In all cases, any particular stimulus was direct or reverse 
rated a minimum of nine times by the subject and the average was then used to assess the 
membership functions of “tall” and “aesthetically pleasing”. Norwich and Turksen report that 
“It has been found for all subjects that direct and reverse ratings appear to yield the 
same membership function (this conclusion will be checked by statistical hypothesis 
testing) and that the axioms of the algebraic-difference structure are obeyed.” [S, p. 121 
Detailed comparisons of the outomes of the two scaling procedures or of the axiom tests have not 
been provided. Furthermore, the algebraic-difference axioms refer to a comparison procedure, and 
therefore their satisfaction does not validate the very different direct or reverse rating procedures, 
Major goals of the present study 
Both the direct rating and reverse rating are examples of direct psychophysical scaling techniques, 
which have yielded remarkably stable relations within psychology between physical scale values 
and estimates of psychological magnitudes over a wide variety of sensory continua. However, as 
also noted by Thole et al. [8], psychological scales developed with direct methods may be distorted 
by a number of response biases. Because of the difficulties that have plagued many attempts to 
measure psychological magnitudes directly, some psychophysicists, notably Fechner [ 171 and 
Thurstone [IS], have turned to discriminability or confusability between stimuli as a method for 
inferring psychological magnitudes indirectly [ 193. Thurstone’s model, which was originally 
formulated as a psychophysical theory, and signal detection theory [e.g. 161, which emphasizes 
both judgmental as well as sensory determinants, are examples of indirect psychophysical analyses. 
Recognizing some of the major advantages of indirect scaling procedures, Thole et a[. remarked 
that 
“As yet, however, no practical indirect technique, the result of which is more than 
an interval scale, is available.” [8, p. 1701 
However, this situation was addressed at least in part, by the work of Wallsten er al. [4], which 
utilized a graded pair-comparison procedure in two experiments to test the algebraic-difference 
axioms and to measure membership on an interval scale. The functions had interpretable shapes 
and predicted an independent set of judgments. 
A major purpose of the present study is to compare two scaling procedures for measuring 
membership functions, a direct rating and the indirect graded pair-comparison procedure developed 
by Wallsten et al. [4]. The theoretical significance of investigating the invariance of fuzziness-or 
lack of it-under different scaling procedures has already been mentioned above. But there is also 
a practical reason for the comparison. Indirect scaling procedures are notoriously more laborious 
than direct ones [S], requiring a multiple of n(n - 1)/2 rather than of n judgments. Our comparison 
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of the two scaling procedures should show whether the membership function remains invariant 
when the less taxing procedure is used. 
The imprecise concepts whose membership functions were to be measured consisted of probability 
phrases such as probable, unlikely, possible, and so forth, with which most people, including experts 
in medical diagnosis, military intelligence and weather forecasting, generally prefer communicating 
their uncertain opinions. Wallsten et al. [4] also utilized probability phrases. A second purpose of 
the present study is to examine the effects of modifiers like very and rather on the shape and 
interpretation of membership functions for probability phrases. 
METHOD 
Four groups of 5 subjects each were employed, each responding to a different set of five 
probability phrases. Table 1 shows the probability phrases for each group. Altogether the 
membership functions of 13 probability phrases were scaled. The phrase possible was presented to 
all 20 subjects; the 4 phrases probable, improbable, likely and unlikely were each presented to 10 
subjects; and the same 4 phrases each modified by rather or very were each presented to 5 subjects. 
In an attempt to minimize context effects. each group was presented with the same mix of “high” 
and “low” phrases. Each had a high probability term (probable or likely), a low probability term 
(improbable or unlikely) as well as one of those terms modified by rather and the other by very, 
plus a single “neutral” phrase (possible). Antonyms were not presented in the same group. 
Subjects 
Subjects were social science and business graduate students at the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill. They were recruited by placing notices in graduate student mailboxes in the School 
of Business and the Departments of Political Science, Economics, Library Science, Psychology and 
Sociology. None of the subjects had participated in any similar experiments on the measurement 
of membership functions. The notices described the general nature of the study and promised the 
subjects $25 each for three sessions of approx. 45 min each. Twenty native speakers of English were 
randomly assigned to Groups 1, 2, 3 or 4. As explained above in conjunction with Table 1. the 
groups differed only in terms of the phrases they judged. 
General procedure 
Subjects were run individually for a practice session followed by two data sessions, with the 
sessions scheduled generally l-2 days apart. The experiment was controlled by an IBM PC with 
stimuli presented on a color monitor and responses made with a joystick. During the practice 
session all the subjects judged the probability phrases tossup, good chance and poor chance, whereas 
during Sessions 2 and 3 they judged the phrases indicated in Table 1. 
Each session consisted of three parts, all of which employed spinners drawn on the computer 
monitor. Part 1 employed one spinner, Part 2 employed two spinners and Part 3 employed six 
spinners. as described below. Each spinner was divided radially into two sectors, one red and the 
other yellow. The subjects were instructed to imagine a pointer over each spinner that could be 
spun so that it randomly lands over either the red or yellow sectors. Thus, without ever using 
numbers. each spinner displayed a probability of the spinner landing on yellow. 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were instructed that the purpose of the study was 
“to determine how people use and understand non-numerical probability phrases, such as good 
chunce, poor c,hunce and rossup. for communicating judgments about uncertainty”. Subjects were 
told that there were no right or wrong answers, just individual judgments. 
T.ihie I Prohahdny phrarer used m the experiment 
Gr0up I Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
L’crrr prohuhlr Prohahlr Very Irkel) Rarher /ikeI)’ 
Prohuhlr Rather prohuhlr Llkd) Likely 
Poaxhlu P<,\slh/e Possible Powhle 
L’nlnkel\ Cnltkrl> lmprohuhle lmprohuhle 
Rather unl~krl, Very unhkel> Ruther improhnhlr Very improhohlu 
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Subjects then were instructed how to use a joystick to move an arrow to the left or right on a 
straight line and how to push buttons on the joystick assembly to register their responses. Several 
practice trials followed to provide the subjects experience with the joystick controls. 
The subsequent instructions were divided into three parts, each corresponding to a different part 
of the session. The instructions for Part 1 were intended to elicit membership functions for the 
same phrases by a direct scaling procedure referred to hereafter as direct estimation (DE). The 
instructions for Part 2 involved the assessment of membership functions of the five probability 
phrases by the indirect scaling procedure employed by Wallsten et al. [4], referred to hereafter as 
pair-comparison (PC). The instructions for Part 3, which was designed to allow a comparison 
between the DE and PC procedures, involved a measurement of membership functions of the same 
five probability phrases on an ordinal scale only. A rank ordering (RO) scaling procedure was used 
for this purpose. Because the results depend strongly on characteristics of the experimental 
procedures. each part will now be described in more detail. 
Part I 
Five probability phrases were presented in this and the subsequent two parts (cf. Table 1). 
Associated with each phrase were six probabilities displayed as relative areas of yellow on a spinner. 
The probabilities associated with the “low” terms (improbable, rather improbable. very improbable. 
unlikely, rather unlikely, very unlikely) were 0.05, 0.14, 0.23, 0.32, 0.41 and 0.50; the probabilities 
associated with each of the “high” terms (probable, rather probable, very probable, likely. rather 
likel),, very likely) were 0.50, 0.59, 0.68, 0.77, 0.86 and 0.95; and the probabilities associated with 
the single “neutral” phrase (possible) were 0.32, 0.41, 0.50, 0.59, 0.68 and 0.77. Thus, each 
membership function was approximated by six points with a difference of 0.09 between adjacent 
points on the probability continuum. Practical considerations determined that six points be used 
to approximate what are essentially continuous membership functions, and the previous results of 
Wallsten et al. [4] determined the probability ranges for the “low” [O.OS,O.SO], “high” [0.50,0.95] 
and “neutral” [0.32,0.77] probability phrases. 
Each probability phrase was presented twice. Thus, Part 1 consisted of 5 phrases x 6 probabilities 
per phrase x 2 replications for a total of 60 trials. The probability phrase was always displayed at 
the top of the screen and a spinner divided into red and yellow sectors was drawn below it. The 
60 phrase x probability combinations were presented in a random order. 
The instructions for the DE procedure read in part: 
“On each trial in Part 1, a probability phrase will appear at the top of the computer 
screen. One spinner will be drawn directly below this phrase. You are to indicate 
how well the probability phrase describes the probability of landing on yellow for 
the displayed spinner. If you think that the spinner probability is very well described 
by the phrase, move the arrow to the right. If the spinner probability is not at all 
well described by that phrase move the arrow far to the left. The relative location of 
the arrow on the line should correspond to how well (right) or how poorly (left) the 
phrase describes the probability.” 
The joystick was used to move the arrow on the screen, and a button on the joystick box was 
used to register the response when the arrow was suitably placed. The arrow could be positioned 
at any of 200 equally spaced locations on the line. 
Part 2 
On each trial a single probability phrase was written at the top of the screen, and two spinners 
displaying different probabilities of yellow were drawn below it, one on the left and one on the 
right. The instructions for the PC procedure read in part: 
“In this part of the experiment you are to move the arrow along the line towards 
the spinner which is best described by the phrase at the top of the screen. The distance 
you move the arrow toward one of the spinners should reflect your confidence in 
that judgment. So if you think that the probability of yellow on one of the spinners 
is very much better described by the phrase than is the probability of yellow on the 
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other spinner, move the arrow all the way to that end of the line. If the phrase 
describes the probability on one spinner only slightly better than the other, move 
the arrow just slightly off center.” 
Each phrase was associated with the same six probabilities as described in Part 1. However, 
rather than presenting each phrase-probability combination twice as in Part 1, each phrase was 
now presented once with each of the 6 x 5/2 = 15 spinner pairs, for a total of 75 trials. Phrases 
and spinner pairs were presented in a random, not a blocked order. 
Part 3 
On each trial a single probability phrase was printed at the top of the screen and six spinners 
each displaying a different probability of yellow were drawn below it. The subject’s task on each 
trial was “to rank order the six spinners according to how well they are described by that phrase.” 
This was done by moving a cursor to the spinner best described by the phrase and then pressing 
a button to register the response. Once the response was registered, the designated spinner vanished 
from the screen. The same procedure was repeated six times until all six probabilities were rank 
ordered. Each of the five phrases was presented twice. 
For 10 of the 20 subjects (2, 3, 2 and 3 subjects in Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively) the DE 
procedure preceded the PC procedure in Session 2, whereas for 10 other subjects the order of Parts 
1 and 2 was reversed in that session. Part 3 always followed Parts 1 and 2. Sessions 2 and 3 were 
identical, except that the order of Parts 1 and 2 were reversed. 
RESULTS 
This section begins with an examination of the psychometric properties of the separate scales 
derived from the DE and PC procedures, following which the membership functions established 
by the two scaling procedures are compared. Effects of the modifiers rather and very are examined 
in the last part of this section. 
The PC procedure 
To describe the scaling of the responses in Part 2, several terms must first be defined. Recall that 
the probabilities on the left and right spinners were changed from trial to trial such that, ignoring 
order, all probability pairs were presented once according to a left side x right side, P x P, factorial 
design in which P = (pI.. ,p,), where the pi (i = 1,. . . , n) denote specific probabilities of the spinners 
landing on yellow. We shall consider the bounded response line on the CRT to extend from 1 on 
the left to 0 on the right, and let R,(i,j) denote the response when probability pi is represented by 
the left spinner, pj is represented by the right spinner and the phrase W is displayed above them. 
By entering the response R,(i, j) in cell (i, j) and 1 - R,(i, j) in cell (j, i), an ordering is induced 
on the factorial design according to the degree that the left-hand probability is better described by 
the phrase than is the right-hand probability. If this ordering satisfies the axioms of an algebraic 
difference structure [ZO], a suitable transformation of the cell entries can be used in a difference or 
a ratio scaling model to establish a membership function for the phrase W [4]. 
More specifically. let (p,,pj) be a cell in the P x P factorial design. Denote the rank ordering 
between any pair of cells by 2 ,,,, where the subscript indicates that the ordering is for phrase W. 
Recall that the ordering is induced by placing an arrow on the response line, so that the further 
to the left an arrow is for a pair of probabilities (spinners), the higher in the rank ordering is the 
pair. Formally, 
(Pi* Pj) 2wH’PkrPJ iff R&i, j) 2 Rw(k, I). 
Krantz et al. [20] proved that if the ordered matrix (P x P, kw) satisfies several plausible 
axioms, then there exists a mapping pw from P into the real numbers such that 
(Pi, Pj) L W (Pk? Pl) 
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(Pi9Pj) ZW(PkIPI) iff PW(Pi)lFW(Pj) 2 Pw(PrYPw(PJ 
These two equations state that scale values can be assigned to these probabilities such that the 
rank order of differences (or of ratios) in the assigned values matches the ran,k order of differences 
(or of ratios) in the degrees to which the left-hand and right-hand probabilities are described by 
the phrase. The derived scale values are unique up to a linear (for the difference representation) or 
a power (for the ratio representation) transformation. Normalized to be non-negative with an 
arbitrary maximum of 1, these scale values can be taken as the (discrete) membership function 
representing the degree to which each probability belongs to the vague concept defined by the 
probability phrase. 
Computationally, the scale values under the difference model are obtained by taking arithmetic 
means of the rows of the n x n matrix D = {D,(i,j)}, where 
Dw(i,j) = CRJi,j) - 01 - [l - R&i, j)] = 2R,(i, j) - 1. (1) 
whereas the scale values under the ratio model are obtained by taking the geometric means of the 
rows of the n x n matrix s = {S&i, j)}, where 
Sdi,j) = CRdi,j) - WC1 - R,(i,j)l = R&i, j)/[l - R&i, j)]. (2) 
To avoid division by zero in the latter equation, the responses R&i, j) = 0. 1 were set equal to 
0.00215 and 0.9975, respectively. 
For more details regarding these two methods of scaling see Wallsten et al. [4], and for a 
discussion of alternative ratio scaling procedures see De Jong [21]. Jensen [22]. Saaty [23.24], 
Saaty and Vargas [25] and Crawford and Williams [26]. 
It should be noted that at an axiomatic level no distinction can be made between the difference 
and ratio representations unless different orderings appear under difference- and ratio-inducing 
conditions [27,28]. This is so because any set of differences can be mapped into a set of ratios by 
taking logarithms, and conversely, any set of ratios can be mapped into a set of differences by 
exponentiating. However, the representations can be compared to each other in terms of the 
correlations computed separately for each model between the observed responses and the responses 
predicted.from the derived scale values [4]. 
To compute these correlations, three steps were taken. First, we computed the measures D,(i, j) 
and S,(i, j) from equations (1) and (2) and subsequently completed the matrices D and s by 
inserting the complementary measures D,,( j, i) = 1 - D,(i, j) and S,( j. i) = 1 IS&i, j) and placing 
OS and Is in the main diagonals of D and s, respectively. Second, the matrices D and s, computed 
separately for each subject, session and phrase, were each scaled according to the difference model 
and ratio model, respectively. Finally, the derived scale values were used to compute for each model 
separately the predicted responses, R$(i, j), and the correlations between R&i, j) and R$(i, j) were 
then computed for each subject, session and phrase separately (each based on 15 pairs of 
observations). 
The mean correlations between R,(i,j) and R$(i, j) over all 20 subjects are shown in Table 2. 
To maintain an equal number of cases for each mean, the phrases probable and improbable were 
pooled together (column 2) as were the two phrases likely and unlikely (column 3), the four phrases 
modified by rather (column 4) and the four phrases modified by very (column 5). Each mean in 
Table 2 is, therefore, based on 20 correlations, 1 per subject. 
A 2 x 2 x 5, model (ratio, difference) x session (2,3) x probability phrase (possible, probable/im- 
probable, likely/unlikel~, rather ( ), very ( )), ANOVA with repeated measures on all three factors 
was conducted on the correlations between R&i, j) and R$(i, j). All three factors were highly 
significant (F = 17.15, p < 0.01, F = 8.86, p < 0.01, and F = 4.08, p < 0.01, for model, session and 
phrase type, respectively). The same ANOVA conducted on the z-transforms of the correlations 
yielded similar results. As shown in Table 2, the correlations between observed and predicted 
responses for the difference model exceeded on the average those for the ratio model; the correlations 
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Table 2. Mean correlations between observed and prcdtcted responses by scabng model. probability phrase and sessmn 
Probabibty phrase 
Scalmg model Session Possible Probable/improbable Unlikelg/likely Rather (9 Very f.1 Over phrases 
Ratm I 0.572 0.747 0.619 0.69 I 0.762 0.619 
2 0.710 0.731 0.700 0.757 0.751 0.653 
DifkXlKX 1 0.691 0.799 0.760 0.753 0.752 0.763 
2 0.727 0.855 0.847 0.846 0.775 0.835 
in Session 3 were higher on the average than those in Session 2; and the correlations for the 
probability phrase possible were lower on the average than the correlations for all other probability 
phrases. 
The significant session effect may be due either to changes in the shapes of the membership 
functions from Session 2 to 3 or to fewer response errors due to learning. To choose between these 
two hypotheses, the reliability of the scaled values was assessed by computing the correlation 
between the derived scale values in Sessions 2 and 3 for each subject and model separately over 
the probability phrases. With 5 different phrases and 6 scale values per phrase, each correlation 
was based on 30 pairs of observations. Of the 20 correlations computed under the ratio model all 
but 1 were highly significant (p < 0.01). Similarly, all 20 correlations computed under the difference 
model were highly significant (p < 0.01). The mean correlations over subjects were 0.75 and 0.86 
for the ratio and difference models, respectively, demonstrating high reliability of the derived scale 
values and providing additional evidence for the superiority of the difference model over the ratio 
model. 
Based on the test results reported above, we decided to use the Session 3 judgments only, to 
take the scale values derived from the difference rather than the ratio model as the PC membership 
functions, and to analyze the various membership functions for each subject separately. 
The DE procedure 
For each session, the responses of the two replications were averaged and the five membership 
functions with six points per function were determined directly from the mean responses. Reliability 
of the responses was assessed by computing the correlation between the mean responses in Sessions 
2 and 3 over the five phrases for each subject separately. As in the PC procedure, each correlation 
was based on 30 pairs of mean responses. All 20 correlations were highly significant (p < 0.01). The 
mean correlation was 0.86, equal to the mean correlation computed for the difference model under 
the PC procedure. Because of the evidence for session-to-session learning reported in the preceding 
section and the high correlation of the responses between sessions, it was decided to take the scale 
values from Session 3 as the DE membership functions. 
The RO procedure 
As in the DE procedure, the two rankings in each session were first averaged and then five 
membership functions (unique up to an order-preserving transformation) with six points per 
function were determined directly for each subject and session. Reliability of the rankings was 
assessed again by computing rank order correlations between the averaged responses in Sessions 
2 and 3. All 20 correlations, each based on 30 pairs of observations, were highly significant 
(p < 0.01). The correlations ranged between 0.66 and 0.99 with a mean of 0.86, which, surprisingly, 
is exactly equal to the two previous reliability correlations. 
Reasonableness of the membership functions 
Concluding that the three scaling procedures are equally reliable, we next turn to the scale values 
to consider how reasonable they are as membership functions. For this purpose, the derived scale 
values from Session 3 were each normalized to have a maximum at 1, and were plotted separately 
for each phrase and each subject as a function of the spinner probabilities of landing on yellow. 
The solid lines in Figs l-5 represent the membership functions elicited by the DE procedure and 
the dashed lines those elicited by the PC procedure. Figure 1 shows 20 pairs of membership 
functions for the phrase possible. Figure 2 portrays 10 pairs of functions for the phrase probable 
(subjects I-10) and 10 for improbable (subjects 11-20). The membership functions for the pair of 
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Fig. 1. Indlwdual membershlp functions for possible. DE functions are indicated by solid lines and PC 
functions by dashed lines. Numbers in the panels refer to individual subjects. 
antonyms unlikely (subjects l-10) and likely (subjects 1 l-20) are shown in Figure 3. Figure 4 shows 
pairs of functions for the probability phrases rather unlike/y (subjects l-5). rather probable (subjects 
6- 10). rather improbable (subjects 1 1 - 15) and rather likely (subjects 1620). Finally, Fig. 5 displays 
the membership functions for the phrases very probable (subjects l-5), very unlikely (subjects 6- 
10), very likel?, (subjects 1 l- 15) and very improbable (subjects 16-20). Recall that the probability 
values on the abscissas vary between probability phrases as indicated in the figures. 
Table 3 summarizes the types of membership functions found over all subjects for low, neutral 
and high probability phrases. The two low phrases improbable and unlikely are grouped together 
as are the two high phrases probable and likely. The bottom four rows of Table 3 show the latter 
two pairs of phrases modified by rather and oery. Membership functions can be characterized as 
either monotonic increasing, monotonic decreasing, single-peaked or other. In classifying the 100 
pairs of functions we allowed one inversion per function provided its magnitude did not exceed 
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Fig. 2. Individual membership functions for probable (subjects I-10) and improbable (subjects 1 I-20). DE 
functions are indicated by solid lines and PC functions by dashed lines. 
0.10. For example, the PC-elicited function for subject 3 in Fig. 1 is classified as “monotonic 
increasing”, whereas the DE-elicited function for subject 16 in Fig. 1 is classified as “other”. 
The monotonic and single-peaked functions might all be considered reasonable in terms of the 
underlying semantics, whereas those classified as “other” cannot easily be so considered. Table 3 
shows that overall (allowing for no more than one minor inversion, which occurred in about 20% 
of all cases), 90% of the functions are reasonable by this criterion. Arguing again in terms of the 
underlying semantics, one would expect that monotonic functions for low phrases would be 
decreasing, whereas monotonic functions for high phrases would be increasing. Table 3 confirms 
this expectation remarkably well. Excluding the neutral phrase possible, there are altogether 46 
monotonic functions for the high phrases, 44 of which are increasing, and there are 42 monotonic 
functions for the low phrases, all of which are decreasing. 
One would also expect that phrases closer to the two extremes of the probability range [0, I] 
will tend to have more monotonic than single-peaked functions, whereas phrases near the middle 
of the probability range will tend to have more single-peaked than monotonic functions [4]. The 
two modifiers very and rather can be represented as operators acting on membership functions 
[29]. Membership functions of phrases modified by very are expected to be more frequently 
monotonic than functions of phrases modified by rather. Table 3 confirms this prediction, too: of 
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Fig. 3. Individual membership functions for likely (subjects I I-20) and unlikely (subjects l-10). DE 
functions are Indicated by solid lmes and PC functions by dashed lines. 
the 40 functions of phrases modified by very, 36 (90%) are monotonic; whereas of the 40 functions 
of phrases modified by rather, only 17 (42.5%) are monotonic. 
Comparison of the PC urld DE procedures 
Concluding that most of the membership functions are not only stable over time but also 
reasonable and semantically interpretable, we turn next to a comparison of the functions elicited 
by the PC and DE procedures. An inspection of Figs l-5 reveals that in virtually all cases the two 
procedures yield the same shape function. However, with the exception of the phrase possible in 
Fig. 1, the functions elicited by the DE procedure tend to lie above, or dominate, the functions 
elicited by the PC procedure. If two membership functions A and B are defined over the same 
support and function A has larger grades of membership than B, then the concept giving rise to 
function A is more fuzzy or vague than the one giving rise to function B. 
The impression regarding dominance gained from inspecting Figs l-5 is substantiated by the 
frequencies presented in Table 4. For the functions displayed in Figs l-5, we say that function A 
dominates function B if pa(.u) > pB(x) for a,t least five of the six probability phrases in the common 
support of both functions, with equality holding only if ,u”(x) = &x) = I. Table 4 shows that the 
functions elicited by the DE procedure dominate those elicited by the PC procedure in 52 of the 
100 cases, that the reverse occurs in 12 cases only and that in 37 cases neither member of the pair 
of functions dominates the other. The null hypothesis of equal proportions of domination is rejected 
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rather unlikely (subjects I-5) and rather improhahle (subjects I I-15). DE functions are indicated by solid 
lines and PC functions by dashed lines. 
for the total frequencies over phrases (right-hand column of Table 4) by a sign test (p < 0.01). It is 
also rejected for each of the five phrase types in Table 4 except possible. 
Table 4 shows that the DE and PC procedures do not elicit the same membership functions for 
the five phrases under consideration. Although the functions are equally stable over time, equally 
reasonable and of roughly the same shape, those elicited by the DE procedure enhance the mag- 
nitude of the grade of membership or, equivalently, those elicited by the PC procedure reduce it. 
To choose between the two procedures, we invoked the membership functions elicited by the 
RO procedure, which, as may be recalled, are measurable on an ordinal scale only. For each subject 
separately, a rank order correlation was computed between the membership functions elicited by 
the DE and RO procedures in Session 3. The results were pooled over the five phrases. All 20 
correlations, each based on 30 pairs of observations, are highly significant (p < O.Ol), and their 
mean value is 0.82. Similar rank order correlations were then computed between the functions 
elicited by the PC and RO procedures. Again, all 20 correlations are highly significant (p < O.Ol), 
but now the mean value is slightly greater at 0.88. A sign test was used to test the null hypothesis 
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Table 3 Classification of the membershlp functmns m Sewon 3 by shape 
Monotonic Monotomc Smgle- TOtal 
Probablltty phrase lncreastng decreasmg peaked Other frequency 
P0SSlhle 6 3 22 9 40 
Prohuhle /Ike/> 17 2 20 I 40 
lmprohohlvunl~kel~ 0 I6 ?I 3 40 
Rather ~proh./hkrly I IO 0 6 4 20 
Rather , vnproh.. unhkrly , 0 7 I? I 20 
Very (proh.:likelr) I7 0 I 2 20 
Verb Ilmproh. unhkrl~) 0 I9 I 0 20 
that the probability is 0.5 that a correlation between DE and RO exceeds in magnitude the 
corresponding correlation between PC and RO. In 15 of the 20 cases the correlation between PC 
and RO exceeded the corresponding correlation between DE and RO, leading us to reject the null 
hypothesis (p = 0.02). 
A second comparison of the PC and DE procedures consisted of computing the rank order 
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Table 4. Comparison of membership functmnsehctted by the DE and PC procedures 
Probabdw phrase 
Pdhlt- Like1) 
Possible Improbable unllkel> Rorher ( ) Very ( I Total 
DE dominates 4 12 12 I2 I? 52 
PC dommates 5 2 0 2 2 II 
Other II 6 8 6 6 31 
correlation between the functions elicited by the DE and PC procedures in Session 3 (as shown in 
Figs l-5) for each subject and phrase separately. The mean rank order correlation is 0.85. As each 
individual correlation was based on six pairs of observations only, the criterion for rejecting the 
null hypothesis of zero correlation (at p = 0.05) in each instance was set at 0.829. In 33 of the 100 
cases the rank order correlation did not exceed this very high criterion. For each of these 33 cases, 
a comparison was made between the rank order correlation between DE and RO and the rank 
order correlation between PC and RO. Of these 33 comparisons, the rank order correlation between 
PC and RO exceeded that between DE and RO in 24 cases, the reverse occurred in 7 cases and 
the rank order correlations were identical in 2 cases. The null hypothesis of equal proportions of 
cases where one correlation exceeds the other was again rejected by a sign test (p < 0.01). Although 
the RO procedure is not posited as the sole criterion for validating the ordinal properties of 
membership functions, the results of the last two tests provide convergent evidence which points 
to the superiority of the PC procedure over the DE procedure. 
Eflects of very and rather 
A basic problem in quantitative fuzzy semantics is to devise an algorithm for the computation 
of the meaning of a composite term x from the knowledge of the meaning of each of its atomic 
components. Zadeh [29] addressed a special case of this problem in which the composite term x 
is of the form x = mu, where m is a modifier (e.g. m = very, rather, highly) and u is a primary term 
(e.g. likely, intelligent). The fundamental idea is that there is a small number of basic functions that, 
in combination, produce a wide range of modifiers for fuzzy predicates [30]. For example. ver!, 
typically intensifies the particular predicate it modifies. Thus, any attempt to model the effect of 
very should decrease the degree of membership of those elements in the fuzzy set that represent 
the modified term whose degree of membership is < 1 in the fuzzy set represented by the unmodified 
term. A reasonable implementation of the modifier very is based on the unary operator called 
concenrrafion (CON). If the result of applying a concentrator to A is denoted by CON(A), then the 
relationship between the membership functions of A and CON(A) may be given by 
P’cON,“,(X) = /4w~ r) 1, XEU. 
Although Zadeh [29] proposed r = 2 for very (see also, Schmucker [31]), he emphasized that his 
proposed representation was intended mainly to illustrate his approach toward modeling hedges 
rather than to provide accurate definitions. The exact form of the function and the values assumed 
by its parameters can only be determined empirically. 
Another unary operation in fuzzy set theory, which also has no counterpart in ordinary set 
theory, is that of contrast intensification or, simply, intensification (INT). The effect of INT is to 
increase values of P”(X) that are above 0.5 and to diminish those that are below this threshold. It 
may be said. then, that INT heightens the contrast between the elements that are more than half 
in the set and those that are less than half in it [31]. Zadeh [29] proposed a simple concrete 
expression for an operation of this type, which we generalize: 
h!Ax) = 
i 
2r - ’ pIA(x), 
1 - 2’_‘[1 - P”(41r, 
for 0 < p”(x) G 0.5, 
for 0.5 G p”(x) G 1, 
(4) 
where r > 1 and XE U. Although Zadeh restricted himself unnecessarily to r = 2, other values of r 
may achieve the same desired effect on p”(x). 
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The membership functions of the four primary probability phrases that were modified by wry 
are shown in Fig. 2 (probable and improbable) and Fig. 3 (unlikely and likely). Because of the slight 
superiority of the PC procedure over the DE procedure, we restrict our attention in the present 
section to PC-elicited membership functions only. Of the 20 PC-elicited functions, 10 are single- 
peaked and 10 are monotonic. Inspection of Fig. 5, however, shows that for the terms modified by 
very only 2 functions (subjects 15 and 18) are single-peaked; of the remaining 18 functions, 17 are 
monotonic and 1 (subject 13) is classified as “other”. Although subjects 15 and 18 each yielded 
single-peaked functions for both the primary and the modified phrase, in neither case does uery 
actually intensify the primary phrase it modifies. Similarly, when the primary phrase has a single- 
peaked function and the modified phrase has a monotonic function, very cannot be modeled as a 
concentrator. 
We turn next to test Zadeh’s concentration model, equation (3), when the membership functions 
of both the primary and modified phrases are monotonic. To do so, we first refer to Fig. 6 to 
illustrate how the CON operator works in this case. Figure 6 consists of three sections each divided 
into two parts. The solid lines in the upper three parts describe three hypothetical membership 
functions, which are not unlike those displayed in Figs 2 and 3. All three functions are monotonic 
increasing and share the same support. The function on the left is convex (y = ax4 + b), the one 
in the middle is linear (y = ax + b) and the one on the right is concave (y = a log x + b). The dashed 
lines represent the membership functions of the operator CON with r = 2. In each case, CON 
diminishes the degree of membership of those elements whose degree of membership is < 1. Similar 
functions with other values of r can be readily envisioned. 
The three graphs in the lower part of Fig. 6 display the difSerence functions p”(x) - pCONtAj(x). 
The three difference functions are all single-peaked; they assume zero values at the two extremes 
of the probability range (0.50 and 0.95 in the present example) and positive values elsewhere. For 
monotonically increasing functions, the difference function is negatively skewed if p”(x) is convex, 
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Fig. 6. Illustration of the CON operator (top) and of difference functions p(x) - ~co,.,(x) (bottom). 
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symmetric if p”(x) is linear and positively skewed if p”(x) is concave. For monotonically decreasing 
functions, positively and negatively skewed functions are interchanged. If very operates as a 
concentrator on monotonic functions, then the observed difference functions should have similar 
shapes to those displayed in Fig. 6. A very similar approach has been developed by Yager [32]. 
Experimental evidence concerning the effects of very has not supported Zadeh’s conjecture. Hersh 
and Caramazza [9] and MacVicar-Whelan [12] suggested instead that the function shifts by a 
fixed constant (see also, Lakoff [30]). In other words, rather than modeling very by equation (3), 
they proposed to model it by pA(x + c). where c is positive if the membership function of the 
primary predicate is monotonic increasing and negative if it is monotonic decreasing. It follows 
from the latter model that the difference function should have a zero slope for all monotonic 
functions, a positive intercept for monotonic increasing functions and a negative intercept for 
monotonic functions. 
Empirical functions, p,,(x) - P,,,~ w (x), were computed separately for each of the 10 subjects who 
exhibited monotonic membership functions for probable, improbable, unlikely and likely. Figure 7 
displays these 10 difference functions. Because the membership functions are normalized to the 
same maximum, the right-hand ordinates of the top five figures and the left-hand ordinates of the 
bottom five figures must in general be equal to zero. The other extreme points are not so constrained. 
Seven of the 10 difference functions (subjects 1, 5, 7, 12, 14, 16 and 20) in Fig. 7 are seen to be in 
good agreement with Zadeh’s [29] concentration model. Three other functions (subjects 3, 10 and 
17) support neither of the two competing models. 
The membership functions of the four probability phrases modified by rather are shown in Fig. 
2 (probable and improbable) and Fig. 3 (unlikely and likely). Of the 20 PC-elicited functions for the 
primary phrases, 10 were classified as single-peaked, 9 as monotonic and 1 (subject 6 in Fig. 2) as 
“other”. Empirical difference functions, p,+,(x) - p r.rherW(~) were computed for all 19 subjects with 
single-peaked or monotonic functions. Figure 8 shows the difference functions for “single-peaked” 
subjects and Fig. 9 shows those for “monotonic” subjects. 
Two models were tested for the effect of rather on probability phrases. The first model contends 
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that rather increases the fuzziness of the elements of the fuzzy set that represents the modified term. 
This effect may be modeled by another unary operation called dilation (DIL), which has the opposite 
effect of concentration [29]. The relationship between the membership functions of A and DIL(A) 
is given again by equation (3) with r < 1 (Zadeh proposed r = l/2). The second model that we 
tested is due to Lakoff [30], who suggested that the effect of rather be modeled by the compound 
operation INT(CON(x)), where CON is defined by equation (3) and INT by equation (4). 
We computed and studied the difference functions for DIL(x), p,,,(s) - pDILcWI(x), and for 
INT(CON(x)), j+(x) - ~,NT,cON(W))(~), using several hypothetical single-peaked and monotonic 
functions. Several tests that we performed on the observed difference functions, the details of which 
are omitted here, failed to corroborate either of the two models. Inspection of Figs 8 and 9 does 
not reveal any consistent patterns, suggesting, perhaps, that the use of rarher to modify probability 
phrases is highly idiosyncratic. 
DISCUSSION 
The organization of this section is as follows. We first compare the present results to those 
obtained by Wallsten et al. [4]. This is followed by a comparison of the PC and DE procedures. 
Next, the effects of the modifiers are considered. Finally, we return to the issue of scale type. 
Comparison with previous results 
Wallsten et al. [4] employed the graded PC procedure in two experiments to establish membership 
functions for probability phrases similar to those used here. Judgments were highly stable over two 
sessions and the additive-difference axioms were satisfied to a very high degree. Furthermore, the 
derived membership functions representing individuals’ understandings of a given phrase, varied 
greatly from one person to another, but were roughly constant over time for each person. Finally, 
the shapes of the functions were generally semantically reasonable, in that they were primarily 
single-peaked or monotonic, with single-peaked functions predominating for phrases towards the 
center of the [O, 11 interval, monotonically decreasing functions predominating near the low end 
and monotonically increasing functions predominating near the high end of the interval. Because 
the additive-difference axioms were so well satisfied in the previous study, we did not check them 
with the PC judgments in the present experiment. However, in all other respects the present results 
duplicate those of the prior study. 
There is one illuminating difference between the present and preceding PC results. As already 
indicated, one cannot distinguish on ordinal grounds whether subjects are making ratio or difference 
judgments. In the preceding study it was also not possible to distinguish the two kinds of judgments 
on numerical grounds, because the two types of scaling models tended to describe the judgments 
equally well. This was not the case with the present data, however. In the previous experiments, 
the probability values judged for each phrase were quite closely spaced, whereas in this study they 
were separated by 0.09. As a result, there was more opportunity for the ratio and difference models 
to differentially fit the data, and they did. Uniformly, the difference model out-performed the ratio 
model, suggesting that in the PC situation subjects were judging differences rather than ratios. The 
same conclusion has been reached in other measurement contexts on the basis of other experimental 
manipulations [27]. 
The importance of the extensive individual differences in the present and prior results should 
not be minimized. It is clear that averaging over subjects would have been meaningless. Furthermore, 
these results should be troublesome to designers of expert systems who wish to incorporate 
membership functions representing the “meanings” of particular fuzzy terms. 
Comparing the PC and DE procedures 
On theoretical grounds alone, the PC procedure is more justifiable than the DE procedure. First, 
the PC procedure requires comparative rather than absolute judgments, which generally are easier 
for people to make. Second, the nature of the paradigm imposes sufficient structure on the data 
that it is possible to reject a set of judgments as being inconsistent with the underlying model. 
Additional forms of validation such as consideration of the shapes of the membership functions, 
or use of the membership functions to predict independent sets of judgments, are available, of 
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course, for both procedures. Conversely, on pragmatic grounds the DE procedure is preferable to 
the PC procedure because it requires so many fewer judgments. 
As pointed out earlier, a strong form of joint validation occurs when the two procedures give 
rise to the same membership functions. Ideally, one would like the resulting functions to be 
independent of the method of measurement, and when this occurs confidence is increased that the 
two methods are representing the same underlying construct. 
In fact, although the two methods yielded similar functions in virtually all cases, they rarely 
yielded identical functions. The functions did not differ systematically in the case of possible, but 
for the other phrases the DE functions generally dominated the PC ones. In other words, the DE 
functions suggested that the phrases were more fuzzy than did the PC functions. 
Generally when the PC and DE functions differed, the PC function agreed more strongly with 
the RO results than did the DE function. Because it involves only comparison judgments without 
quantitative evaluations, it is reasonable to think that the RO procedure is the simplest of the 
three, and therefore that its results come closest to representing the underlying ordinal characteristics 
of the meanings of the phrases. To the degree that this assumption about the RO characteristics 
is accepted, it can be said that the PC procedure yields more veridical representations than does 
the DE procedure. 
These results can be considered from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Considering 
the theoretical issues first, Wallsten [33] pointed out that unlike measurement in classical physics, 
the quantities being measured are not independent of the instruments doing the measuring. Thus, 
for example, one may compare weights on a pan balance, secure in the knowledge that (unlike in 
quantum physics) the act of measuring does not affect the weights. However, when two degrees of 
membership are compared, those degrees are internal to the same organism doing the comparison, 
and therefore one cannot consider the quantities being measured independently of the method of 
measurement. Thus, one possibility is that the meaning of a vague concept in a particular situation 
to a particular individual actually changes with the method of interrogation. A second interpretation 
is that the meaning stays relatively fixed over measurement procedures, but some procedures lead 
to less distortion than others. According to this second view, comparative non-quantitative judg- 
ments are the simplest to make, and therefore the most accurate (although frequently the least 
informative), while quantitative judgments involve comparison against an internal number scale 
which introduces additional measurement error and therefore judgments that are somewhat more 
similar to each other. These two views cannot be distinguished on the basis of the present data, 
but the latter seems more sensible to us. 
On practical grounds, the outcomes of the two procedures are not so different. Thus, the less 
taxing DE method may frequently yield measures that are sufficiently good for a particular purpose. 
Eflects of modifiers 
It is frequently difficult to compare which of two or more functions fit erroneous data, particularly 
when the functions include free parameters. The comparison is easiest when it can be done on the 
basis of qualitative rather than statistical characteristics of the data. This is precisely what we did 
in testing models for the effects of very and rather (cf. Figs 6-9). 
Considering rather first, the two models tested above are both inconsistent with the responses 
of our subjects. Furthermore, as the difference functions for rather show, the modifier has no 
consistent effect over subjects. It is possible that the term is completely empty and provides no 
modifying effect at all, but it is rather more likely that the term has differential effects for different 
people, depending on their linguistic background. Thus, for some people rather might serve as a 
hedge, i.e. move the meaning of the phrase more toward the center of the [0, I] interval, while for 
other people it serves as an intensifier, and for a third group of people it has, in fact, no real 
meaning. If this is the case, then the modifier rather should be eschewed in the development of 
systems for specific applied purposes. 
The effect of very, however, is clear. Not surprisingly, very acts as an intensifier. It is particularly 
interesting that 18 of the 20 membership‘functions for phrases including very were monotonic, 
despite the fact that 10 of the functions for the base term were single-peaked. Thus, very not only 
intensifies, but it also eliminates any hedging quality to the meaning of the phrase (Wallsten et al. 
[4], distinguished between concepts with hedged and unhedged meanings in that the former had 
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membership values of zero at both the upper and lower boundaries of its domain of support, while 
the latter had membership function values of zero only at one or the other boundary). 
No available descriptive model for the effects of very can handle this full range of results. 
However, when attention is restricted only to those phrases for which the membership function of 
the unmodified term was itself monotonic, i.e. the term already had an unhedged meaning to the 
subject, then Zadeh’s [29] concentration model worked well in 7 of the 10 cases. There was no 
indication whatsoever that very was better represented by a shift than by a concentration function. 
Scale of measurement 
As already indicated, we can consider the minimum scale of measurement guaranteed by our 
procedures, and then whether assumptions are justified or required to yield a yet stronger meas- 
urement scale. The PC procedure, based on the additive-difference axioms, guarantees interval 
scale measurement. Because of the lack of internal structure in the DE procedure, its scale properties 
are not so easily derivable. In order to claim ratio scale measurement we would need empirical 
grounds for establishing membership functions that are truly zero. While such procedures may be 
possible in a different study, they were not invoked here, and therefore we have no basis for such 
a claim. However, our comparisons of the PC and DE procedures, except for the correlations, as 
well as our examination of the effects of modifiers, implicitly involved an additional assumption 
regarding the scale properties. Namely, for each subject we assumed that both the DE and the PC 
functions, as well as functions for different phrases, were all unique up to common linear 
transformations. Although this assumption remains untestable, it yields a pattern of results that 
are sensible and interpretable, and on these pragmatic grounds the assumption may be considered 
reasonable. 
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